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Abstract: Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an
agent or system exploits the similarities that hold between two or more items
— e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on— in order to perform some
cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to cognitive
neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cognition can be
understood through the lens of radical enactivism and why doing so has
advantages over its representationalist rival, which posits the existence of
structural representations or S-representations. Specifically, it is argued that
there are problems both with accounting for the content of S-representations
and with understanding how neurally-based structural similarities can work as
representations (even if contentless) in guiding intelligent behavior. Finally,
with these clarifications in place, it is revealed how radically enactivism can
commit to an account of similarity-based cognition in its understanding of
neurodynamics.
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Introduction
Similarity-based cognition occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the
similarities that hold between two or more items — e.g., events, processes,
objects, and so on— in order to perform some cognitive task. It has been
proposed that conceiving of representations in terms of structural similarities
provides new resources to overcome traditional puzzles that have plagued
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other representational theories of cognition. With respect to the explanatory
needs of cognitive neuroscience, many philosophers maintain that appealing to
similarity-based forms of cognition is the most promising strategy for building
an adequate representational theory of mind (O’Brien 2015a, 2015b;
Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017; Williams 2017; Ramsey 2018; Shea 2018; Lee
2018).
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it challenges the two main
strategies that motivate conceiving neurally-based structural similarities of
interest to cognitive neuroscience as mental representations. Second, once this
clarification is made, the paper explicates how neurally-based structural
similarities can play a part in explaining intelligent behaviour within a radically
enactive and embodied account of cognition.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 introduces the notion of
similarity-based cognition, showing how it is cashed out in cognitive
neuroscience. It focuses on the well-known example of place cells in rats’
hippocampus. Section 2 introduces the arguments in favor of the idea that
neurally-based structural similarities should be conceived of as contentful
structural or S-representations. Section 3 problematizes those arguments,
showing that we have yet to be supplied reasons for thinking that structural
similarities – those that purportedly do explanatory work in cognitive
neuroscience – are contentful. It is argued that defenders of S-representational
interpretation of structural similarities presuppose, but do not explain, the
origin of the contentful properties of structural similarities. If this analysis holds
good, despite claims to the contrary, S-representations fail to answer the job
description challenge. Section 4 examines a less demanding reason for thinking
that neurally-based structural similarities should be conceived of as Srepresentations. Putting aside questions about content, some argue that the
3

alleged fact that structural similarities are exploited by brains in a way that is
analogous to the ways cognitive agents exploit models or maps suffices to
establish the representational status of structural similarities. New empirical
findings concerning the future-oriented activity of place cells are called upon
to justify this position. Against this view, it is argued that these empirical
findings provide no support for the claim that place cells are used in anything
like route-planning or surrogative reasoning. It follows that if there is no robust,
non-metaphorical sense in which the brain uses structural similarities as
models or maps this inferential path to the conclusion that structural
similarities have representational status is blocked. Finally, section 5 explicates
how similarity-based cognition can be understood under the auspices of a
radical enactive, non-representational conception of cognition.

1.

Similarity-Based Cognition in Cognitive Neuroscience

Similarity-based cognition, SBC, is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent
exploits relations of similarity holding between two or more items — e.g.,
events, processes, objects, and so on — in order to perform a cognitive task
(Cummins 1994; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Ramsey 2018).
Everyday examples of SBC include navigating to a location by using a
cartographic map or using a mercury thermometer to discover the current
temperature of a room. In such cases, similarities between items are exploited
by cognitive agents when they treat one item, X, as a surrogate or stand in for a
target item, Y, and when doing so reliably guides behaviour with respect to the
target item. 1 Behaviour is understood broadly here as to include an agent
making embodied responses, taking particular actions, making reliable
judgements or inferences, and explicitly deciding on courses of actions.
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Many philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists assume that fundamental
varieties of cognition are similarity-based (Shagrir 2012; Jacobson 2015;
Kriegestkorte and Kievit 2013; Sachs 2018; Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017,
Williams and Collings 2017; Shea 2018). The guiding hypothesis, when SBC is
pitched at the neural level, is that neural states make a causal contribution to
the processes that drive the behaviour of cognitive systems towards some target
items in virtue of the fact that certain similarities hold between the neural states
and those target items. Call this “neurally-based SBC.”
A thing can be similar to another in many ways, nonetheless. One item may
be similar to another simply by having shared colour, mass, charge, and so on.
However, neural items do not enable cognitive work to get done by possessing
just any kind of similarities with their distal targets. Rather, the similarities at
issue are thought to be of a second-order or structural kind.
O’Brien and Opie (2004) explicate what structural similarity means in the
following terms:
We will say that one system structurally resembles another when the physical
relations among the objects that comprise the first preserve some aspects of
the relational organization of the objects that comprise the second. (pp. 1415, emphasis original)
Cartographic maps, for example, rely on structural similarities. A
cartographic map of Sydney can help us to get around a specific location of the
city just in case its relevant constituents (lines, figures, symbols, and so on) are
arranged in a way that systematically mirrors the topographic and metrical
relations that hold among the relevant constituents (buildings, streets, and so
on) of the city of Sydney. This structure-preserving mapping relationship
holding between the constituents of both systems, the map, and the city,
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guarantees that specific points on the map correspond to specific locations in
the city. The same reasoning applies to mercury thermometers. Mercury
thermometers inform us about the temperature of a particular room just in case
the variations in the height of the liquid column correspond to orderly
variations in the temperature of that room.
When applied to the domain of cognitive neuroscience, the idea is that neural
items can play a causal part in enabling the achievement of a cognitive task in
virtue of the fact such neural items mirror relevant structural properties of some
target domain. 2 Accordingly, whether the cognitive task can be successfully
achieved depends, at least in part, on the degree to which the neural item at
issue structurally mirrors the relevant target domain.
For cognitive neuroscientists, neurally-based SBC can be called upon to
explain a vast array of cognitive phenomena – including visual perception,
motor control, memory, imagination. In recent years, the remarkable potential
of such explanations has become evident with the advent of predictive
processing accounts of cognition — those which assume that the best and most
unified explanations of cognitive phenomena need to posit generative models
operating across multiple scales and levels (Clark 2016; Gładziejewski 2016;
Williams 2017; Sachs 2018).
Neurally-based SBC is most famously invoked in explanations of rodent
spatial navigation (see Bechtel 2016; Shea 2018). Years after Tolman
hypothesized the existence of a “cognitive map” to explain spatial navigation
in mammals (Tolman 1948), researchers discovered that individual neurons
allocated into regions DG, CA1 and CA3 of the rats’ hippocampus fire “solely
or maximally when the rat was situated in a particular part of the testing
platform facing in a particular direction” (O’Keefe and Dostrovsky 1971, p.
172). Follow-up studies by O’Keefe (1976) and O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) also
6

showed that neurons in the CA1 region respond primarily to location, with
some of them—20 out of the 26 firstly reported—firing when the rats occupy or
run past the appropriate location. Scientists called the hippocampal neurons
involved in navigation tasks “place cells.”
The current scientific consensus assumes that place cells within the rats’
hippocampus play a causal role in enabling navigation tasks — namely, finding
shortcuts towards a food source — because they are structurally similar to the
environment. More precisely, it has been discovered that the patterns of coactivation relationships between the cells (roughly, their tendency to show joint
activity) mirror the structure of metric relations among different relevant
locations within the environment (Bechtel 2016; Knierim 2015; Pfeiffer and
Foster 2013). Accordingly, the structure-preserving mapping relationship
holding between the activation profile of the place cells and the spatial layout
of the environment contributes to explaining the capability of rats to
successfully navigate the environment, even in complete darkness.
Given this, place cells are taken to be the realizers of the cognitive map
previously hypothesized by Tolman (Schmidt and Redish, 2013). For example,
it has been claimed that the whole system of place cells provides other parts of
the rats’ brains with “an internal map of the spatial layout of the environment,
encoded in a Cartesian coordinate system” (Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017,
p. 344; O’Keefe and Dostrovsky 1971, p. 174).3 In the same vein, Ramsey (2016)
holds that place cells function “as component parts of an encoded map of the
environment that the rat is trying to navigate. They … are serving as
surrogative stand-ins within a broader map-like neural structure” (p. 9).

2.

The Case for Structural Representations
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For many, the very existence of causally potent structural similarities at the
neural level entails the existence of a special kind of mental representation.
Proponents of this idea call these mental representations “structural” or “Srepresentations.”
As canonically described, S-representations can be conceived of as
components of larger cognitive mechanisms – where such mechanisms are
partly individuated by reference to the function they perform. Imagine a
mechanism M which is responsible for cognitive function F. M is an Srepresentational system if its ability to perform F causally depends on the fact
that at least one of its components R is structurally similar to some target
domain T.4 If that is the case, M can fail to perform F if R is not sufficiently
structurally similar to T; and, analogously, if M succeeds in bringing about F, it
is in part due to the fact that R is sufficiently structurally similar to T.5
Nonetheless, despite the popularity and promise of S-representations in
cognitive neuroscience, if such neural items are to count as bona fide cognitive
representations, they must face up to the “job description challenge” (Ramsey
2007). 6 According to this challenge, if something is to count as a cognitive
representation it must satisfy two conditions.
First, it has to be shown that the structure in question possesses content such
that it refers, denotes or depicts something else as being a certain way. 7
Canonically, a cognitive state or structure bears representational content if and
only if it has conditions of satisfaction of a special sort – namely if it is
susceptible to being true or false, veridical or non-veridical, right or wrong, and
so on (Neander 2017; Shea 2018; Lee 2018). Moreover, the class of realistic
theories of mental representation we are considering takes the content of such
representations to be inherent — this is, not supplied by external attributions.
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Second, it must be shown how this structure plays a causal role in cognition
in virtue of its content.8 This is because, as Sprevak (2011) reminds us, if content
“is just along for the ride, and does no causal or explanatory work, then there
seems no reason to assume that the state in question is specifically
representational, rather than, say, a causal relay with the same effects” (p. 670).
As such, nothing will be a mental representation if it does not play a distinctive
causal-explanatory role in cognition in virtue of its content. This is a pivotal
point, for having content is what distinguishes mental representations from
other states that can also causally contribute to bringing about cognitive
activity.
It is claimed that S-representations can answer the job description challenge.
Even Ramsey (2018), who originally issued the challenge, tells us that Srepresentations will form “an essential part” of our best representational-cumcomputational accounts of cognition (p. 269, see also Opie and O’Brien 2015;
Williams and Colling 2018; Lee 2018). Likewise, Piccinini (2018) observes that
there is “an emerging consensus that the best way to understand representation
in the context of cognitive explanation is structural” (p. 5).
What, apparently, makes S-representations fit for such special theoretical
duty? Why do so many theorists think that S-representations manage to answer
the job-description challenge while all other theories of mental representation
fail?

Allegedly,

S-representations

have

unique

properties,

and,

in

understanding them, it becomes evident how such mental representations have
inherent content and how those contents can play a genuinely causal role in
driving cognition.
The favoured position in the literature is that S-representational vehicles “are
contentful in virtue of resembling their represented objects” (O’Brien 2015a, p.
9). Defenders of S-representations claim that structural similarities “ground”
9

mental representational content (O’Brien and Opie 2004, p. 6, 8-14; O’Brien
2015a, p. 10). Following Von Eckardt (1993), this means that structural
similarities are taken to be the “set of properties or relations that determine the
semantic properties in question” (p. 199).
The rationale is as follows. The properties of a given S-representational
vehicle, R, cause it to be structurally similar to some target state of affairs, T.
Because R can mirror the structure of T more or less accurately, structural
similarity entails accuracy conditions. Accuracy conditions are taken to entail
content. Therefore, structural similarity is taken to entail content. Thus, Srepresentationalists conclude, the fact that R structurally mirrors T entails that
R contentfully represents T.
According to this line of reasoning, the contentful properties of Srepresentations are supplied by the vehicular properties that make them
structurally similar to their targets. If this is right, the contents of Srepresentations, unlike the contents of symbolic representations, are inherently
and non-arbitrarily related to the properties of their vehicles (Williams 2017;
Lee 2018).
Moreover, since it is assumed that such structural similarity is causally
relevant for the success or failure of a given cognitive function, if structural
similarity entails content then it follows that cognitive systems whose behavior
is causally guided by the structural similarities holding between its Srepresentational vehicles and their targets are cognitive systems whose
behavior

is

causally

guided

by

mental

representational

contents.

Representational contents fixed by structural similarities are, according to Srepresentationalists, unproblematically causally potent of cognition.9
With this in mind, O’Brien and Opie (2010) tell us that cognitive processes
that involve S-representations:
10

are driven by the very properties that determine the content of its vehicles.
In this sense, an [S-representational system] is not a mere semblance of a
semantic engine—it’s the real thing. Any organism whose inner processes are
analog in nature is causally indebted to the semantic properties of its inner states (p.
127, emphasis added).
Thus, according to their defenders, S-representations are not only consistent
with what we know about cognitive neuroscience, but they are better equipped
to solve the classical challenges faced by other representational theories in
cognitive science. In light of this, S-representations have been invoked in
virtually every area of cognitive science, including classic symbolic
computation (Gallistel 1990; Gallistel and King 2009), connectionism (O’Brien
and Opie 2006, 2009), and predictive coding (Gładziejewski 2016; Kiefer and
Hohwy 2017).

3.

The Case Against Structural Representations

A standard, first-pass objection to S-representational theories of mental
representation is that, even if we accept all that has been said so far, any content
an S-representation might have is indeterminate.10
To see this, consider, again, cartographic maps — the paradigm example of
non-mental S-representations. A map might be said to contentfully represent
Sydney if the metrical relations among its constituent elements mirror the
metrical relations between the relevant features of Sydney. Yet it can be the case
that the very same map mirrors, perhaps to a different degree, the spatial layout
of New York City as well. If that is the case, it would seem that S11

representationalists have to say that the same map represents both Sydney and
New York City. Simply put, if the representational content of a map is wholly
and uniquely determined by what it structurally mirrors, then what it
represents, assuming it represents at all, is indeterminate.
Two main solutions to this content-specificity problem have been offered in
the literature. The first solution proposes that the content of an S-representation
is fixed, not only by what is being mirrored, but by whatever the Srepresentation targets when it is used to guide cognitive activity. Here we can
assume, along with Godfrey-Smith (2006), that “[t]he target of a map is just
whatever the map is in fact used to deal with” (p. 58).11 The second solution,
instead, proposes that S-representational contents get determined etiologically
– that is, by what they were selected for dealing within the history of the
cognitive agent’s engagements.12
We should not be distracted by these possibilities. A much stronger objection
to S-representations focuses not on what makes the putative content of
structural similarities determinate, but on whether structural similarities have
any inherent content at all. Ultimately, the S-representationalist package is only
tenable if it can account for the source of S-representational contents. In other
words, what is required is a naturalistic account of the representational content
of S-representations.
Recall that to be a structural representation, “a state must belong to a system
of states that bear a second-order [structural] similarity to their targets … and
the states must guide action based on their similarity to their target” (Piccinini
2018, p. 3). We are also told that “when a system’s internal states satisfy [the
above conditions] they qualify as representations in a robust sense, which
possess semantic content by the lights of a naturalistic theory of semantic
content” (Piccinini 2018, p. 3).
12

Yet, the pivotal question for S-representationalists is whether the holding of
structural similarity relations – on their own – suffices for one state of affairs to
specify, refer or describe something about another state of affairs in a way that
can be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, veridical or non-veridical. In other
words, whether the fact that a particular item structurally mirrors another item
suffices for the former to contentfully represent the latter.
On close examination, we contend, even though structural similarities might
be said to ground content in the sense of enabling contentful evaluations and
inferences, there is no reason to believe that such structural similarities, in-anof-themselves, are inherently contentful.
Consider the following case. Against the backdrop of certain practices, we
can use variations in the level of the tides in a particular region to make
inferences and say something true or false, for example, about changes in the
position of the Moon relative to the Earth. In any particular case, attending to
the level of tides may or may not be an accurate or reliable way of keeping track
of or saying something true about the position of the moon. The same goes for
the way we use variations in the height of the liquid column of a mercury
thermometer to make inferences about changes in the ambient temperature of
the room. In both cases, certain structural correspondences or similarities must
hold for the claims to be true and the inferences valid. This is so even though
there is no reason to suppose that the structural correspondences in question
must, themselves, represent things accurately or inaccurately.
In other words, it does not follow from the fact that we can make truthevaluable claims based on structural similarities holding between two items, A
and B, that A contentfully represents something that might be true or false
about B. It is thus logically confused to suppose that the correspondences or
structural similarities in question must be contentful in order for us to rely on
13

them in ways that make it possible to be right or wrong about things
contentfully.
Following Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017), we can imagine a cognitive
agent whose behavior is endogenously controlled by a mechanism that is
sensitive to the fact that some internal states of the agent change concurrently
with changes in the external environment. In such a scenario, we agree that a
promising way to explain how the agent manages to cope with the environment
“is to point to the [structural] similarity between its internal processes and the
processes in the environment” (Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017, p. 351). We
disagree, however, that this would be a case in which the behavior of the agent
is causally guided by representational content. Again, this is because we have
no reason to believe that structural similarities that meet the stated conditions
suffice for mental representations with contentful properties. The mere fact that
structural similarities can play a causal role in enabling successful acts of
cognition does nothing to establish that structural similarities are contentful.
So far, we have been given no reason to suppose that structural similarities
are sufficient for or entail content (see Goodman 1968, Fodor 1987, Hutto 2008
for similar claims). If structural similarities do not suffice for or entail content,
then a fortiori they do not get their cognitive work done in virtue of possessing
content.
In this light, if S-representationalists hope to meet the job description
challenge they must do more than simply presuppose that neurally-based
structural similarities are contentful; they must explain how and why structural
similarities are contentful. To answer this, in essence, requires answering the
general challenge posed by the Hard Problem of Content, or HPC, articulated
by radical enactivists (Hutto and Myin 2013). What is needed is a substantial
theory that accounts for S-representational content.
14

One option, at this point, is to attempt to explain S-representational content
by appeal to some further theory of mental representational content. Most
philosophers turn to teleosemantics to do this crucial work. For example,
Thomson and Piccinini (2018) tell us that teleosemantics is “the best-developed
and most plausible theory of representational content in biological systems” (p.
194).
Yet teleosemantics faces well-known shortcomings (Stich 1990; Fodor 1990;
Rosenberg 2015; Burge 2010, Hutto and Myin 2013; Hutto and Satne 2015). To
use a familiar example, whereas teleosemantics can explain why frogs snap
their tongues in presence of black dots, it lacks the resources to specify,
unequivocally, whether the frog’s visual system represents them as “black
dots,” “flies,” “food,” and so on. Thus, even though teleosemantics provides
the required resources to explain how organisms come to systematically target
certain aspects of the world and not others, it fails to deliver a robust theory of
representational content according to which entities are picked out
intensionally or under a description.
We will not rehearse those arguments again here. Instead, we will assess
Lee’s (2018) attempt to address those concerns afresh and head-on. Concurring
with the above analysis, Lee (2018) holds that existing S-representational
accounts have only “touched upon the issue of how to think about content” (p.
2). In an attempt to do better on this score, he aims to “show in detail how we
can provide a naturalised understanding of content that dispels the strongest
accusations of the antirepresentationalist” (p. 2).
Along with other defenders of S-representations, Lee (2018) holds that
structural similarities are “what underwrites the representation’s degree of
accuracy (its ‘accuracy value’)” (p. 2). But this, again, is insufficient to show that
S-representations

have

content.

Notably,

Lee

acknowledges

that
15

correspondences of the sort structural similarities embody do not explain the
source of representational content. He agrees that answering the HPC requires
providing an account of S-representational content that does not rely solely on
the notion of information-as-covariance.
At this juncture, Lee looks to the notion of non-natural information as a
promising way to address the HPC since, arguably, this notion allows for the
possibility of misrepresentation.13 He tells us that:
a non-natural information bearer is distinct from a natural information
bearer in that it is both potentially decouplable from the conditions it bears
information about, and the conditions it bears information about may be
false. Yet both intuitively, and implicitly within the practice of cognitive
science, non-natural information remains ‘informative’ (p. 9).
But, ultimately, Lee’s (2018) strategy falls short of providing a straight
answer to the HPC. This is so because, as he admits, in these debates “there is
no adequate theory which justifies the presence of non-natural information” (p.
10).
In the end, instead of answering the HPC, Lee (2018) argues that
considerations about the explanatory role of non-natural information in
cognitive science give us reason to question the legitimacy of what the HPC
demands. As he holds, faced with a choice between recognizing the centrality
of non-natural information to explanations of cognitive neuroscience or the
need to answer the HPC, we should question “the severity of the HPC” (p. 10).
In sum, rather than explaining how S-representations can have content, Lee
(2018) motivates acceptance that they do so by focusing on the explanatory
work allegedly achieved by S-representational contents. As he argues, given
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the kind of explanatory work earmarked for S-representations, we are
warranted in assuming that S-representations have content.
Specifically, Lee (2018) holds that if S-representations are involved in errordetection work then we are justified, in light of explanatory need, in assuming
that they are contentful. Why so? In his own words:
If one’s theory of a system features an S-representation with a feedback
component, whereby the system adjusts its behaviour based on a mismatch
between an S-representation and some feature of a task, then this mismatch
… provides further justification for thinking that error, therefore accuracy
conditions (therefore content), contributes to our understanding of how the
mechanism works. (p. 12)
The important thing to notice is that not all mismatches entail
representational errors. In fact, a key claim of radical enactivism (Hutto and
Myin 2013, 2017) is that it is possible for some cognitive activities of agents to
be “pragmatically mis-aligned, insensitive to certain features of the
environment in a way that causes their efforts to fail” (Roelofs 2018, p. 246).
Therefore, when explaining why such cognitive activities go wrong it would be
a mistake to assume that cognitive systems must always go wrong by
representing things wrongly. This is true even in those cases in which a
pragmatic misalignment is brought about by a failure of a system’s internal
structures to mirror those of some target sufficiently well (see Kirchhoff and
Robertston 2018).
Moreover, a system may be sensitive to such failures and may respond by
effecting a stronger match of its internal states to some target, thereby
improving its chances of successful outcomes. Yet a system can do all of this
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without any part of it specifying or contentfully representing that certain
conditions hold.
Imagine a set of keys, but only one of them can open a particular lock. Each
key has its own unique geometry such that only one ‘fits’ the lock sufficiently
well to open it. We can imagine a system designed to attempt to open the lock
by using those keys. We can also imagine that the system is sensitive to the
resistance of being unable to turn the key as a signal to try another key, and that
it will continue with such a strategy – using one key after the another – until it
succeeds.
What this simple example shows is that it is possible to be sensitive and
responsive to mismatches in the completing of tasks without having to
contentfully represent such mismatches (see Miłkowski 2015 for additional
examples). This being the case, it is possible to explain a system’s sensitivity to
mismatches and its capacity to make corrective adjustments to them without
calling on the notion of representational content.
In conclusion, even if we accept that there is similarity-based cognition at the
neural level, we argue that appealing to structural similarities provides no new
resources for overcoming the hard problem of content – namely, that of
accounting for the origins of content naturalistically – and, a fortiori, helping us
to understand how such putative contents could possibly make a causal
difference to cognition. At the same time, pace Lee (2018), we see no compelling
reasons for believing that there is an indispensable explanatory need to posit
the existence of such representational contents, even in the case of cognitive
systems that are equipped with error-detection mechanisms.

4.

A Further Case Against Structural Representations
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Might contentless structural similarities still play a causal-explanatory, and yet
properly representational, role in cognitive science even if they are contentless?
Some proponents of S-representations seem to think so.
Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) maintain that the new emphasis on the
explanatory value of structural similarities in cognitive neuroscience affords
“an opportunity to develop, strengthen, and indeed reform the mainstream
understanding of what representations are” (2017, p. 338, emphasis added). For our
purposes, the crucial adjustment would be to divorce the notion of mental
representation from any and all connections with the notion of content. 14
Others, such as Jacobson (2003, 2015), argue that no revision is needed. This is
because, by her lights, the notion of content is a philosophical invention, and
cognitive neuroscience has long been in the business of positing contentless
representations.15
How can we understand S-representations as contentless but nevertheless
representational? What justifies thinking of such structural similarities as
representations if we assume that they lack content?
A familiar argument for this conclusion defends the idea that structural
similarities function as maps or models in cognitive systems at the neural level.
According to this view, since maps and models are primary examples of
everyday non-mental representations, this gives us reason to regard neurallybased structural similarities as paradigm mental representations.
Ramsey (2016) articulates this view in the following terms:
If we think of mental representations not as indicators but instead as
something more like elements of maps, models or simulations, then we can
at least get the outlines of a story about how a part of the brain could actually
function in a representational manner. (p. 7)
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Yet for this argument to have bite neurally-based structural similarities must
be more than merely map-like or model-like. They must actually function as
maps or models in cognition. Why so? The reason is obvious. Everything is
map-like or model-like to some degree. Hence, without further qualification, it
is trivial to satisfy this criterion. Consider that humans are protozoa-like, and
vice versa in that both humans and protozoa have cells.
So, the real question is: Are structural similarities actually exploited by a
cognitive system or some part of it as models, maps, or surrogates of distal
targets? Again, this question is important because, if they are, then there would
be strong reasons to think, by analogy, that they are playing a bona fide
representational role in cognition.
Reasons have been given for thinking that neurally-based structural
similarities should be thought of play the role of a map in cognition. For
example, elaborating on the place cells, Ramsey (2016) maintains that:
Insofar as these neural transformations implement a coordinate geometry
during navigation that reflects the structure of the items and properties of
the environment, it is perfectly natural and, more importantly, explanatorily
beneficial to regard such a system as functioning as a map. Specific elements of
the system are thus functioning as representations of features of the target
domain (p. 8, emphases added).
At this juncture, however, we must be careful not to conflate evidence that
the neural structures in question have map-like properties with evidence that
brains or cognitive systems are using such structures as maps. 16 What needs to
be shown is that the way the rat’s brain uses place cells in order to guide
navigation is analogous, in a full-bodied sense, to the way agents use
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cartographic maps. This is pivotal since, again, robustly satisfying the analogy
is what, allegedly, secures that place cells are playing a representational role.
Some philosophers argue that new empirical findings regarding place cells
motivate thinking that the analogy with maps holds strongly in this case (see
Gładziejewski 2015; Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017, Shea 2018). These
empirical findings show that, in some circumstances, hippocampal neurons fire
in advance of action. As Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) argue, this
evidence supplies a compelling reason to think that place cells are not only
responsive to the current location of the animal but, rather, that they are used
by the rats’ brains as surrogates to plan potential routes towards a target
location.
For example, after having recorded neural activity in the CA3 region of the
hippocampus of rats engaging in decision tasks, Johnson and Redish (2007)
discovered that many sequences of spikes, or “sweeps,” fired by place cells
during theta oscillation correspond to locations ahead of the rat.
For their experiment, they used two different mazes—one (called “multipleT maze”) consisting of four T choice points and another (called “cued-choice
maze”) consisting of a single T turn. Both mazes had two return trails with two
places providing reward food, but only the feeders on one side were providing
food each day. In addition, different cue sounds were played before the final
turn (the so-called “choice point”), indicating which side would provide
reward on each trial.
When rats reached the choice point, they faced a high-cost decision — taking
the incorrect route means having to run approximately 3 m along the track
before having another chance. Experimenters saw that, after being trained, rats
often paused at the choice point, and that place cells corresponding to locations
in both return trails fired while the individuals were standing still. Importantly,
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the sweeps occurred separately — first for the cells corresponding to one side,
and then the other — and they were not correlated to the orientation of the
animal.
In a more recent experiment, Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) used a 2m x 2m openfield arena with 36 clearly demarcated locations. In the experimental task, rats
had to alternatively forage for food rewards between randomly distributed
locations and a stationary ‘home’ base. The location of the home base changed
daily but remained constant within each day so that rats could remember it.
Importantly, Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) found that in the moments when a rat
paused before taking a journey, sequences of activity in place cells not only
sweep ahead of it, but they transiently predict the journey that the animal is
about to take.17 Like in the previous experiment, future-oriented sweeps were
seen to be independent of the rat’s orientation. As they explain, these
discoveries “reveal a flexible, goal-directed mechanism for the manipulation of
previously acquired memories, in which behavioral trajectories to a
remembered goal are depicted in the brain immediately before movement”
(Pfeiffer and Foster 2013, p. 78).
According to Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017), this body of empirical
evidence reinforces the view that place cells are exploited in a way that is
strongly analogous to the process of consulting a cartographic map. As they
write: “the [hippocampal] map is internally manipulated [and] these
manipulations are functional for the navigational mechanism in that they
(presumably) serve as a basis for route planning” (p. 351). Likewise, Shea (2018)
tells us that the evidence “suggests that rats use this prospective activity to plan
the route they are about to follow” (p. 115).
Yet, again, a note of caution is needed. The experiments show that place cells
sometimes activate in a future-oriented manner, and that such activity is
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strongly biased toward the satisfaction of a goal. Yet even if the future-oriented
activity of place cells plays a part in explaining how rats navigate to a location,
it does not follow that the process in question equates to or involves route
planning.
For this to be the case, forward sweeps would need to be involved in a
process of evaluation so that they are used by other parts of the brain as
surrogates of the available routes in order to choose the preferred one
(Miłkowski

2015).

This

is

something

the

experimenters

themselves

acknowledge:
Nonlocal forward [sweeps] are not sufficient for the consideration of future
possibilities. Such consideration processes would also require mechanisms
for the evaluation of nonlocal [sweeps] as well as mechanisms for flexible
translation into behavior. (Johnson and Redish 2007, p. 12184)
The problem, however, is that it remains unclear whether, how and where
this evaluation takes place. As Schmidt and Redish (2013) acknowledge, the
hippocampus is thought to be part of a complex neural network that involves
several brain structures, but it is unclear how the mentioned hippocampal
activity interacts with the other brain structures in order to generate behavior.
As they write, after these empirical findings “researchers must now explore
what processes generate these place-cells sequences, and how they are used in
recalculating the journey home” (p. 43; see also Pfeiffer and Foster 2013, p. 78).18
Therefore, however ‘natural’ it may be to gloss what is going on in the rat’s
brain as a map-using process, considering the current available evidence, we
should not assume that the rat’s brain engages in any kind of planning by
means of surrogative reasoning in these cases. There is no evidence available
that the neural activity that drives behavior in response to place cell firings is
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anything like the process of consulting a cartographic map in order to navigate
a location and plan a route. We agree with Godfrey-Smith (2006) that:
It is natural from the scientist’s point of view to say that the rat is using X
[the structure of place cells] as a guide to Y [the maze], but as far as the
mechanics of the situation are concerned, the ‘as guide to Y’ claim seems
extraneous. (p. 51; see also Rosenberg, 2018, p. 138)
Thus, without further evidence to show why we should think of these
processes as robustly, and non-metaphorically, involving the use of a mental or
cognitive map, we conclude that calling neurally-based structural similarities
maps or models is unsupported. It follows that their representational status, in
so far as it allegedly depends on they being used as models or maps, is
unjustified.

5.

A Radical Enactive Take on SBC

So far, we have argued that there is no reason to assume that the existence of
causally potent neurally-based structural similarities entails the existence of
mental representations. An important consequence of our analysis is that nonrepresentational accounts of cognition can embrace neurally-based SBC. In
what follows, we briefly explore how neurally-based SBC might be construed
under the auspices of one radical view of cognition – namely, the radical
enactive account of cognition, or REC, advanced by Hutto and Myin (2013,
2017).
A signature idea of REC is that cognition does not always and everywhere
involve or entail representational content. When engaged in perceptual-motor
tasks, for example, REC proposes that organisms can detect, track, and interact
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with salient aspects of the environment by sensing and responding to the
covariant information available in it, but they need not internalize or represent
such information.
REC challenges the longstanding assumptions that the brain is either the seat
of cognition or plays the chief role in enabling cognitive activity in virtue of
neural states representing aspects of the environment. This, however, is not to
deny that, at least for certain kinds of cognizers, neural activity plays a
fundamental part in cognition, including basic forms of cognition. REC
assumes that the primary function of dispositional patterns of neural excitation
and inhibition is to coordinate the dynamically unfolding responses of
organisms as they attune and adjust to environmental offerings in completing
specific tasks (see also Engel et al. 2013; Gallagher 2017). We contend that
adopting

such

a

non-representational,

action-oriented

approach

to

neurodynamics is compatible with accepting that neurally-based structural
similarities may play a pivotal role in explaining centrally important forms of
intelligent and target-oriented behavior.
In understanding the kind of work the brain does in cognition REC draws
on Anderson’s theory of neural reuse (Anderson 2014). For Anderson, different
parts of the central nervous system — at different scales, individual neurons,
neural networks — are used and reused to accomplish different cognitive tasks.
When this occurs, the various regions of the brain are temporarily softassembled into functional units or systems. Accordingly, brains causally
contribute to enabling intelligent behavior in a variety of circumstances by
“putting [the same neural structures] together in different patterns of functional
cooperation” (p. 5).
Following Anderson’s theory, Hutto et al. (2017) have proposed that brains
are fundamentally “protean.” The Protean Brain Hypothesis conjectures that
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brain structures are functionally malleable and context-dependent. Braininvolving cognitive systems, according to this hypothesis, make use of neural
structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to meet the system’s needs in
specific circumstances.
Importantly, for our purposes, the way neurally-based structural similarities
help to explain certain instances of intelligent behavior can be understood in
conjunction with neural reuse and the Protean Brain Hypothesis. Accordingly,
the dynamic activity of the central nervous system can play a part in enabling
intelligent behavior by temporally reconfiguring already existing neural
structures in order to resemble specific aspects of relevant targets. This is a
particular way of understanding how the dynamics of the central nervous
system can make a causal contribution to the intelligent behaviour of cognitive
systems without assuming that the brain is in the business of representing the
external world.
Crucially – focusing again on the parade case of place cells – the possibility
that rat brains are using the forward-orientated firing of place cells for route
planning is not the only available interpretation of the empirical evidence.
Following Gallagher (2017), we contend that the fact that place cells fire in
advance of action can be alternatively understood as “a constitutive part of the
action itself, understood in diachronic, dynamical terms, rather than something
decoupled from it” (Gallagher 2017, p. 14). On this view, anticipatory neural
activity, operating on elementary timescales, can play a part in engendering
larger-scale temporally extended cognitive activity (Stepp et al. 2011).
Importantly, this can be the case even if the neural activity in question is not
used by the rest of system as a separate process that fuels further distinct acts
of reasoning or inference about possible courses of action.19
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6.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have challenged the popular suggestion that the existence of
neurally-based SBC gives us reason to believe in S-representations. We offered
two arguments against this view.
First, we argued that there is no reason to suppose that structural similarities,
in themselves, suffice for or entail content. Hence, there is no reason to think
that structural similarities do their cognitive work in virtue of possessing
contents. If so, then S-representations fail to answer the job description
challenge.
Second, we have also shown that there is no compelling evidence that
neurally-based structural similarities function in a robust sense like maps when
doing their cognitive work. Focusing on the parade case of place cells, we
argued that the existing empirical evidence regarding the future-oriented
activity of place cells does not provide compelling grounds for thinking that
such neurally-based structural similarities are being used as maps, models, or
surrogates of the external world.
Putting all of this together, we conclude that there is no reason to assume
that the existence of causally potent neurally-based structural similarities
entails the existence of mental representations. Therefore, pace Thomson and
Piccinini (2018), we should not infer from the fact that modern techniques in
experimental neuroscience allow us to observe structural similarities doing
causal work in cognition that we are observing S-representations in action.
A crucial consequence of our analysis is that radical embodied, nonrepresentational accounts of cognition can embrace neurally-based SBC. We
have defended this view in the context of REC and the Protean Brain
Hypothesis (Hutto and Myin, 2013, 2017; Hutto et al. 2017). Importantly, going
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radical on this score enables us to acknowledge the value the core machinery
neurally-based SBC while characterizing it in more deflationary terms. It
should be clear, however, that in challenging the representational status of SBC,
and

in

taking

a

non-representational,

action-oriented

approach

to

neurodynamics, REC is breaking with business-as-usual cognitive science.
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1

Swoyer (1991) illustrates this familiar phenomenon with the following example: “By
examining the behavior of a scale model of an aircraft in a wind tunnel, we can draw
conclusions about a newly designed wing’s response to wind shear, rather than
trying it out on a Boeing 747 over Denver. By using numbers to represent the lengths
of physical objects, we can represent facts about the objects numerically, perform
calculations of various sorts, then translate the results back into a conclusion about
the original objects. In such cases we use one sort of thing as a surrogate in our
thinking about another, and so I shall call this surrogative reasoning” (p. 449,
emphasis original).
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2

It is common in the literature to depict the mapping or mirroring relations in terms
of isomorphism. However, current examples in neurocomputational theories of
cognition appeal to highly abstract structure-preserving mapping relations that are
considerably weaker than isomorphism (see Neander 2017, p. 176; see also
Gładziejewski 2016; Morgan 2014). For our purposes, we can remain neutral with
respect to this discussion. We will speak more generally and inclusively of
structural similarities or resemblances (see O’Brien and Opie (2004) and Shea (2013,
2018) for a technical and detailed analysis of these notions).

3

It is not obvious that place cells constitute a Cartesian coordinate system. For
example, Bechtel (2016) has argued that “[w]hereas in a cartographic map the
spatial locations between representations correspond, albeit only approximately
and with distortions, to the spatial relations between the places represented, this is
not true of the map realized in place cells” (p. 1297, emphasis added). Shea (2014)
raises similar doubts, observing that “[t]he mechanism depends on place cell firing
correlating reliably with location, but not on any relation between different place
cells, nor on spatial relation between locations” (p. 126, emphasis added).

4

“Explanations that invoke S-representations should thus be construed as causal
explanations that feature facts regarding similarity as an explanans and success or
failure as an explanandum. To exploit structural similarity in this sense is to use a
strategy whose success is causally dependent on structural similarity between the
representational vehicle and what is represented” (Gładziejewski and Miłkowski
2017, p. 340, emphasis added).

5

The relationship between similarity and success is not a straightforward one.
Consider a cartographic map. A cartographic map does not fully replicate the
terrain it is meant to represent. On the contrary, it simplifies it – only including
elements that are relevant for the function it was designed to achieve. A map that
resembles its target too much would become excessively complex and thus useless.
The same rationale applies to S-representations. As Gładziejewski and Miłkowski
(2017) note, “too much similarity can render the S-representation inefficient at
serving its purpose” (p. 344).

6

In order to recognize the scope of the job description challenge it is important to
mention that it does not just trouble S-repesentational theories in cognitive
neurosenience. Instead, serious worries have been raised in its wake about the
tenability of classical cognitivist’s conjecture that cognition is rooted in digital
computation. For, even if cognition proves to be digitally instantiated, there are
deeper unanswered puzzles about how representational contents could be causally
efficacious, rather than being systematically screened off from playing any causal
explanatory role.
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7

Accordingly, something only counts as a mental representation if it is “used to
represent a … target as being a certain way that it might or might not be” (Neander
2017, p. 35; Rescorla 2016).

8

As Thomson and Piccinini (2018) present it, the received view is that “[f]or
something to count as a representation, it must have a semantic content (e.g., ‘‘there
is yogurt in the fridge’’) and an appropriate functional role (e.g., to guide behavior
with respect to the yogurt in the fridge)” (p. 193).

9

Invoking the much-discussed example of the thermostat, O’Brien seeks to
demonstrate “the causal efficacy of content fixed by resemblance” (2015a, p. 9). As
he tells us, the thermostat’s functioning is causally driven by the structural
similarity holding between the curvature of the bi-metallic strip and the
temperature of the room. Thus, if it is assumed that structural similarities are
intrinsically contentful it would follow that representational contents can be
causally efficacious of behavior.

10

Another, related, objection has to do with the fact that structural similarities, unlike
representations, are symmetrical. A map structurally mirrors the layout of a city as
much as the city structurally mirrors the layout of the map. If that is the case, Srepresentationalists have to conclude that the city represents the map too. To solve
this problem, a number of authors have suggested to rethink the representation
relation as a triadic relation, this is, as a relation that involves not only the
representational state and its target, but also a representational user or consumer
(Millikan 1984; O’Brien 2015a). With this condition at hand, we can now say that
what makes the map a representation of the city, and not the other way around, is
the fact that the map is being used or consumed as such by a cognitive agent or
system.

11

O’Brien (2015a, 2015b; see also O’Brien and Opie 2015) proposes a similar solution
to the content-specificity problem, putting emphasis on the interpretive activity of
users. According to this idea, an S-representational state R of a system S is a
representation of T if S’s responses to T are causally mediated by R. As he writes,
“the behavioural dispositions of the system restrict the represented domain to [T],
and the second-order resemblance relations determine what [features of T] each
vehicle represents” (O’Brien 2015a, p. 11).

12

Ramsey (2016) holds that a neural state R is a representation of T if T caused R to
come about and acquire the structure it has. Thus, if a particular S-representation
“was developed in an effort to learn how to navigate a specific maze, then it is that
particular maze that is the target [of this S-representation]” (p. 7). Accordingly, in
such cases, S-representational content is not fixed by structural similarity relations
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solely, it is also fixed by the relevant causal relations that brought the Srepresentational vehicle into existence.
13

As Lee (2018) explains, “x bears natural information about y, iff x reliably covaries
with y. In this case, x’s bearing information about y is dependent on a direct physical
relationship. By contrast, x bears non-natural information about y iff x stands-in for
y, where x’s tokening does not entail the truth of y. In this instance, x’s bearing
information about y is not dependent on any direct physical relationship” (p. 8).

14

There is a tendency in the current literature to attempt to deflate the mainstream
notion of mental representation. Egan (forthcoming) has suggested that we can treat
representational content as an explanatory gloss. She proposes this maneuver as a
way of retaining the notion of mental representation in the cognitive sciences while
avoiding the seemingly intractable problem of providing a naturalistic explanation
for the origin of representational contents. For detailed discussions of this kind of
deflationary move see Ramsey (forthcoming) and Hutto and Myin (2018).

15

Interestingly, Jacobson justifies this idea by directly appealing to the explanatory
role of similarity in cognitive neuroscience. As she writes: “With the rise of
representational similarity and their elaboration of what representation in
neuroscience amounts to, there seems no doubt now that cognitive neuroscientists
have in mind a very different notion of representation … cognitive neuroscience is
not employing contentful representations” (2015, p. 3).

16

As Shea (2018) explains, “the remarkable discovery of the location-specific
sensitivity of place cells does not, by itself, show that rats have a cognitive map” (p.
115).

17

For their experiment, Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) recorded the activity of 250 place
cells at short time scales (circa 20 ms). The sequences or sweeps measured by Pfeiffer
and Foster occur during sharp-wave-ripple (SWR) events—this is, irregular burst
of brief (100-200 ms) high-frequency (140-200 Hz) neuronal activity. Place cell
sweeps during SWR events are traditionally associated to processes of memory
consolidation during sleep.

18

Another, related, issue has to do with the relation between the discoveries of Pfeiffer
and Foster (2013) and the ones of Johnson and Redish (2007). Schmidt and Redish
(2013) ask: “what is the relation between these two planning phenomena? Does one
negate the need for the other?” (p. 43)

19

There is a growing literature in cognitive neuroscience that holds that a nonrepresentational reading of forward-oriented neural activity is feasible. According
to these views, it is possible to understand the contribution of the future-oriented
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neural activity to the system’s behaviour without assuming that this neural activity
represents future events (see, e.g., Kirchhoff and Robertson 2018; Gallagher 2017;
Stepp et al. 2011).
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